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I. INTRODUCTION
In 1992, the United States Supreme Court seemingly resolved the
contentious issue of whether a target corporation could currently deduct the investment banking fees and costs it incurred when a
friendly buyer acquired it. In INDOPCO, Inc. v. Commissioner,1 the
Court clearly held that target corporations cannot deduct current investment banking fees and costs when they obtain only future benefits in a merger.2 After INDOPCO, taxpayers began to worry that the
Internal Revenue Service (IRS) would require them to capitalize otherwise currently deductible business expenses simply because those
expenses yielded some future benefit.3
Although the IRS initially confirmed taxpayers’ fears when it began to extend INDOPCO’s holding, courts responded by limiting
* J.D., with High Honors, Florida State University College of Law, 2001; B.B.A.,
Florida International University, 1998.
1. 503 U.S. 79 (1992).
2. Id. at 88. The Court held that the target corporation, National Starch, could not
currently deduct investment banking fees and costs because it obtained future benefits
from its merger with Unilever. Id. See also W. Curtis Elliot Jr., Capitalization of Operating
Expenses After INDOPCO: IRS Strikes Again, 5 S.C. LAW. 29, 30 (1993).
3. Lee A. Sheppard, The INDOPCO Case and Hostile Defense Expenses, 54 TAX
NOTES 1458, 1459 (1992) (“Read broadly, Indopco means that the taxpayer always loses;
that many expenditures not encompassed by section 263 must be capitalized because they
produce a future benefit.”).
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INDOPCO considerably. Initially, the IRS used INDOPCO’s “deductions are exceptions to the norm of capitalization”4 language in conjunction with the separate and distinct asset test5 to aggressively
deny deductions for expenses that taxpayers had otherwise currently
deducted. Recently, however, the Third Circuit, in PNC Bancorp, Inc.
v. Commissioner,6 applied a stricter version of the separate and distinct asset test.7 Similarly, when the IRS began denying taxpayers’
current deductions for expenses because those expenses created some
type of future benefit, the Eighth Circuit, in Wells Fargo & Co. v.
Commissioner,8 responded by applying a stricter version of the future
benefit test than the Supreme Court applied in INDOPCO.9 Finally,
when the IRS refused to distinguish between hostile and friendly
takeovers, the Seventh Circuit, in A.E. Staley Manufacturing Co. v.
Commissioner,10 ruled that it must.11
However, because INDOPCO remains good law and many circuit
courts have yet to address the numerous issues that it raises, taxpayers need additional protection from INDOPCO. Therefore, Congress should direct the Treasury to enact regulations that codify the
Third, Seventh, and Eighth Circuit holdings to prevent the IRS from
asserting its aggressive post-INDOPCO positions in other circuits.
Accordingly, this Comment posits that even though some courts
have eased taxpayer concern by limiting INDOPCO to its facts, taxpayers need greater reassurance that other courts will not revive
INDOPCO. Part II addresses the differences between current deductions and capital expenses. Part III discusses the law before
INDOPCO, as well as the Supreme Court’s INDOPCO opinion. Part
IV recounts the IRS’s aggressive positions after INDOPCO. Part V
argues that these positions promote poor policy because they lack rationale, violate the matching principle, and ignore the important distinction between friendly and hostile transactions. Part VI describes
how courts have contained the IRS’s positions and limited INDOPCO
to its facts. Finally, Part VII proposes treasury regulations that cod-

4. INDOPCO, 503 U.S. at 84.
5. Comm’r v. Lincoln Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 403 U.S. 345, 354 (1971) (espousing the
separate and distinct asset test, which instructed taxpayers to capitalize an expense that
creates or increases the value of a separate and distinct asset).
6. 212 F.3d 822 (3d Cir. 2000).
7. The court found that to be capitalizable, the expense must create a separate and
distinct asset and not merely be associated with separate and distinct asset creation. Id. at
830.
8. 224 F.3d 874 (8th Cir. 2000).
9. The Wells Fargo court found that to be capitalizable, the expense must be not only
related to a transaction that produces a future benefit, but also directly related to that
transaction. Id. at 886.
10. 119 F.3d 482 (7th Cir. 1997).
11. Id. at 489.
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ify the Third, Seventh, and Eighth Circuit holdings to ensure that
other courts do not restore INDOPCO.
II. THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN CURRENT DEDUCTION AND CAPITAL
EXPENSE
When a taxpayer incurs an expense, that taxpayer may treat it in
one of three ways: (1) as a current deduction; (2) as a depreciable or
amortizable capital expenditure; or (3) as a nondepreciable or
nonamortizable capital expenditure. Each alternative has different
tax consequences for the taxpayer. When a taxpayer treats an expense as a current deduction, that taxpayer may deduct the expense
from his or her taxable income.12 When a taxpayer treats an expense
as a depreciable or amortizable capital expenditure, he or she takes
the expense and spreads it over the useful life of the asset to which it
relates.13 When a taxpayer treats an expense as a nondepreciable or
nonamortizable capital expenditure, a taxpayer takes the expense
and adds it to the basis14 of the asset to which the expense relates.15
When a taxpayer sells the asset, he or she will recognize a gain on
the amount realized minus the basis.16 Essentially, the taxpayer gets
to deduct the expense when he or she sells the asset because the expense reduces part of the amount realized.17
The Internal Revenue Code (the Code) contains two main sections
that helps the taxpayer determine which of the three treatments apply to a particular expense. The first section, § 162(a), states that
“[t]here shall be allowed as a deduction all the ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year in carrying on
any trade or business.”18 However, a second section of the Code, §
263(a), limits § 162(a). Section 263(a) states:
No deduction shall be allowed for—(1) [a]ny amount paid out for
new buildings or for permanent improvements or betterments
made to increase the value of any property or estate . . . [or] (2)
[a]ny amount expended in restoring property or in making good
the exhaustion thereof for which an allowance is or has been
made.19

12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.

I.R.C. § 161 (1994); Id. § 162(a) (1994 & Supp. V 1999).
Id. §§ 167, 168 (1994 & Supp. V 1999).
An asset’s basis is generally its cost. Id. § 1012 (1994).
Id. § 1016(a) (1994 & Supp. V 1999).
Id. § 1001(a) (1994).
E.g., Treas. Reg. § 1.1016-2(b) (1960).
I.R.C. § 162(a) (1994 & Supp. V 1999).
Id. § 263(a) (1994 & Supp. V 1999).
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Section 263(a) trumps § 162(a).20 Therefore, a taxpayer may still have
to treat an expense that falls under § 162(a) as a capital expense if
the expense also falls under § 263(a).21
To receive a current deduction, taxpayers strive to fall under §
162(a) and stay outside of § 263(a). Taxpayers favor current deductions because they allow taxpayers to reduce their taxable income
currently rather than over time.22 The IRS, however, wants taxpayers to fall within § 263(a), which delays deductions and maximizes
the IRS’s current revenues.23
If a taxpayer must treat an expense as a capital expenditure,
however, he or she prefers to treat it as a depreciable or amortizable
capital expenditure, rather than a nondepreciable or nonamortizable
capital expenditure. When an expense is depreciable or amortizable,
the taxpayer may take the expense and spread it over the life of the
asset it relates to.24 Therefore, instead of taking the entire expense
and deducting it from taxable income in the first year, the taxpayer
may take a portion of the expense and deduct it from taxable income
every year over the related asset’s life.25 To do so, however, the taxpayer must know the life of the asset involved or determine the life
based on industry standards.26 When an asset’s useful life is
undeterminable, the expenses related to that asset are
nondepreciable or nonamortizable capital expenditures.27 In that
case, the taxpayer cannot reduce his or her taxable income by any
portion of the expense. Instead, the taxpayer must add the expense
to his or her basis in the related asset.28 When the taxpayer
eventually sells the asset, he or she may deduct this cost from the
sale price to arrive at his or her taxable gain.29
Taxpayers prefer current deductions over depreciable or amortizable capital expenditures due to the value of money doctrine.30 The
time value of money doctrine states that a taxpayer would rather pay
taxes later than sooner because a dollar today has greater value than

20. PNC Bancorp, Inc. v. Comm’r, 212 F.3d 822, 827 (3d Cir. 2000).
21. Id.
22. Melissa D. Ingalls, INDOPCO, Inc. v. Commissioner: Determining the Taxable Nature of a Target Corporation’s Takeover Expenses, 43 DEPAUL L. REV. 1165, 1165 (1994).
23. Id.
24. I.R.C. §§ 167, 168 (1994 & Supp. V 1999).
25. When the related asset is a tangible asset (i.e., a building), this process is called
depreciation. Id. § 167. When the related asset is an intangible asset, this process is called
amortization. Id. § 197 (1994 & Supp. V 1999).
26. See Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)-1(b) (as amended 1972).
27. Treas. Reg. § 1.263(a)-1 (as amended 1994).
28. I.R.C. § 1016(a) (1994 & Supp. V 1999).
29. Treas. Reg. § 1.1016-2(b) (1960).
30. See Ingalls, supra note 22, at 1170.
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a dollar in the future.31 Therefore, a taxpayer would rather reduce his
or her taxable income in year one rather than little by little in subsequent years. By the same token, a taxpayer would rather reduce his
or her taxable income little by little in subsequent years than reduce
his or her taxable income at the end of some unknown period of
time.32
To summarize, due to the time value of money, a taxpayer’s expense categorization preferences rank in the following order: (1) current deductions; (2) depreciable or amortizable capital expenditures;
and (3) nondepreciable or nonamortizable capital expenditures.33
INDOPCO creates a problem by giving the IRS the potential to convert certain expenses from current deductions into nondepreciable or
nonamortizable capital expenditures, thereby giving taxpayers a
large economic jolt.34
III. INDOPCO’S FAMILY TREE
In Commissioner v. Lincoln Savings & Loan Ass’n,35 the U.S. Supreme Court characterized an expense as a capital expense because
it created a “separate and distinct additional asset.”36 The taxpayer,
Lincoln Savings and Loan Association, paid two premiums to the
Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation.37 The first premium funded the primary reserve, which included a general insurance fund for all participants.38 The “additional premium” funded the
secondary reserve, of which Lincoln Savings held a pro rata share.39
The issue in Lincoln Savings involved whether Lincoln Savings could
deduct the additional premium that it paid to the Federal Savings

31. For example, if a taxpayer has a $100 tax liability payable either this year or next
year (assuming no penalty), he would rather pay it next year because if he invests $90.91
today at a 10 percent rate of return he will have $100 next year. Thus, by getting to pay his
tax liability next year, he reduces his tax bill by $9.09.
32. Id. However, taxpayers must balance their expected time value of money savings
with the possibility that tax rates may increase. If tax rates increase, a taxpayer would
rather defer his or her deduction to offset income in later years where tax rates are higher.
On the other hand, if tax rates decrease, a taxpayer would prefer taking his or her deduction sooner because the current tax rate is higher than the future tax rate.
33. David J. Roberts, Capitalizing the Target’s Transaction Costs in Hostile Takeovers, 73 WASH. L. REV. 489, 492 (1998) (“Because of both the time value of money and the
fact that an immediate deduction can reduce taxable income for the current tax year, taxpayers generally consider immediate deductions more valuable than deductions taken
gradually over a number of years.”).
34. The INDOPCO Court realized this problem but provided no solution. See
INDOPCO, Inc. v. Comm’r, 503 U.S. 79, 84 (1992) (“[W]here no specific asset or useful life
can be ascertained, [the cost] is deducted upon dissolution of the enterprise.”).
35. 403 U.S. 345 (1971).
36. Id. at 354.
37. Id. at 348.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 349-50.
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and Loan Insurance Corporation as an ordinary and necessary business expense under section 162(a).40 In holding that it could not, the
Court stated:
[T]he presence of an ensuing benefit that may have some future
aspect is not controlling; many expenses concededly deductible
have prospective effect beyond the taxable year.
What is important and controlling, we feel, is that the . . . payment serves to create or enhance for Lincoln what is essentially a
separate and distinct additional asset and that, as an inevitable
consequence, the payment is capital in nature and not an expense,
let alone an ordinary expense, deductible under § 162(a) . . . .41

According to the Eighth Circuit, “[n]o less than five of the Federal
Circuit Courts of Appeal[s] erroneously interpreted [the language
above] to mean that the Supreme Court had adopted a new test for
determining whether an expenditure was currently deductible or
must be capitalized.”42
Each of these Circuits, in response to the Lincoln Savings decision,
adopted a new “separate and distinct additional asset” test, or
some variation thereof. The new test permitted necessary business
expenditures to be fully deducted during the taxable year unless
the expenditure created or enhanced a separate and distinct additional asset.43

This mischaracterization lasted until the INDOPCO decision, which
disavowed the separate and distinct asset test as the exclusive test
for distinguishing between deductible expenses and capital expenditures.44
INDOPCO addressed whether a target corporation may currently
deduct certain professional expenses incurred during a friendly takeover.45 The target, INDOPCO, Inc., formerly named National Starch
and Chemical Corporation, was an adhesives, starches, and specialty
chemical products supplier.46 The acquirer, Unilever, was one of National Starch’s customers and wanted to buy it in a friendly transaction.47 During the takeover negotiations, National Starch used Morgan Stanley “to evaluate its shares, to render a fairness opinion, and
40. Id. at 345-46.
41. Id. at 354.
42. Wells Fargo & Co. v. Comm’r, 224 F.3d 874, 881 (8th Cir. 2000). See also Central
Tex. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. United States, 731 F.2d 1181 (5th Cir. 1984); NCNB Corp. v.
United States, 684 F.2d 285 (4th Cir. 1982); First Sec. Bank of Idaho v. Comm’r, 592 F.2d
1050 (9th Cir. 1979); Colo. Springs Nat’l Bank v. United States, 505 F.2d 1185 (10th Cir.
1974); Briarcliff Candy Corp. v. Comm’r, 475 F.2d 775 (2d Cir. 1973).
43. Wells Fargo, 224 F.3d at 881.
44. INDOPCO, Inc. v. Comm’r, 503 U.S. 79, 86-87 (1992).
45. Id. at 80.
46. Id.
47. Id.
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generally to assist [it] in the emergence of a hostile tender offer.”48
Shortly after Morgan Stanley found the $73.50 per share final offer
to be fair, the parties consummated the transaction.49
Morgan Stanley charged National Starch a fee of more than $2.2
million, as well as $7,586 for out-of-pocket expenses and $18,000 for
legal fees.50 The Debevoise, Plimpton, Lyons & Gates law firm
charged National Starch $490,000 in legal fees and $15,069 in out-ofpocket expenses.51 National Starch itself incurred $150,962 in miscellaneous expenses such as accounting, printing, proxy solicitation,
and SEC fees.52 On its federal income tax return, National Starch deducted the fees it paid Morgan Stanley, but did not deduct the fees
and expenses it paid the Debevoise law firm or the other miscellaneous expenses it incurred.53 The IRS disallowed National Starch’s deduction for Morgan Stanley’s fee.54
National Starch sought a redetermination from the U.S. Tax
Court and asserted its right to deduct its banking fees and expenses,
as well as its legal and miscellaneous expenses.55 The Tax Court,
agreeing with the IRS, ruled that all of the expenses were capital expenses and therefore not deductible under § 162(a).56 The court based
its holding primarily on the merger’s long-term benefits to National
Starch.57 On appeal to the Third Circuit, National Starch contended
that the disputed expenses were currently deductible because they
did not create or enhance a separate and distinct additional asset.58
But the Third Circuit rejected this argument and affirmed the tax
court, agreeing that Unilever’s enormous resources and the transaction’s synergy prospects served National Starch’s long-term betterment.59
The U.S. Supreme Court also rejected National Starch’s argument
that Lincoln Savings’ separate and distinct asset test represented
the exclusive test for distinguishing between currently deductible expenses and capital expenses.60 Moreover, the Court made it a point to
state that “deductions are exceptions to the norm of capitalization.”61

48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

Id. at 81.
Id. at 81-82.
Id. at 82.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Nat’l Starch & Chem. Co. v. Comm’r, 93 T.C. 67, 73 (1989).
Id. at 75.
Id.
Nat’l Starch & Chem. Co. v. Comm’r, 918 F.2d 428-31 (1990).
Id. at 432-33.
INDOPCO, Inc. v. Comm’r, 503 U.S. 79, 86-87 (1992).
Id. at 84.
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Furthermore, the Court clarified that Lincoln Savings did not reject the future benefit test as a means of distinguishing an ordinary
business expense from a capital expenditure.62 The Court held that
although the mere presence of an incidental future benefit cannot
warrant capitalization, “a taxpayer’s realization of benefits beyond
the year in which the expenditure is incurred is undeniably important in determining whether the appropriate tax treatment is immediate deduction or capitalization.”63
Applying the newly revived future benefit test to INDOPCO’s
facts, the Court determined that the benefits National Starch obtained included: (1) synergy, which the Court called “resource-related
benefits”; (2) the transformation from a publicly held to wholly owned
subsidiary, which included the advantage of swapping 3,500 shareholders for one and thus eliminating expenses related to reporting
and disclosure obligations, proxy battles, and derivative suits; and (3)
the administrative convenience and simplicity of eliminating previously authorized but unissued shares of preferred stock and reducing
the total number of authorized shares of common stock from eight
million to one thousand.64
IV. THE IRS’S AGGRESSIVE POST-INDOPCO POSITIONS
The IRS viewed the Supreme Court’s ruling in INDOPCO as “a
green light to seek capitalization of costs that had previously been
considered deductible in a number of businesses and industries.”65
After INDOPCO, the IRS could use the Supreme Court’s holding that
“deductions are exceptions to the norm of capitalization”66 when applying Lincoln Savings’s separate and distinct asset test67 to aggressively deny deductions for expenses that the IRS had previously allowed taxpayers to currently deduct. INDOPCO also favored the IRS
by lifting the “separate and distinct asset barrier” that five circuits
had placed on the IRS.68 INDOPCO also allowed the IRS to deny current deductions in cases where the expense created some type of future benefit for the taxpayer even though it did not create a separate
and distinct asset. Finally, because the Supreme Court in INDOPCO
did not limit its holding to friendly acquisitions, the IRS could freely
deny current deductions for expenses related to both friendly and
hostile acquisitions. This section explores how the IRS took advantage of all that INDOPCO offered.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.

Id. at 87.
Id. at 87. This language revived the future benefit test.
Id. at 88-89.
PNC Bancorp, Inc. v. Comm’r, 212 F.3d 822, 824 (3d Cir. 2000).
INDOPCO, 503 U.S. at 84.
Comm’r v. Lincoln Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 403 U.S. 345, 354 (1971).
See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
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A. The IRS’s Position in PNC Bancorp
After INDOPCO, the IRS used Lincoln Savings’s separate and
distinct asset test and INDOPCO’s “deductions are exceptions to the
norm of capitalization” language to deny current deductions for costs
it had always allowed taxpayers to currently deduct. For example, in
PNC Bancorp, Inc. v. Commissioner,69 the Commissioner took the position that the taxpayer had to capitalize marketing, researching,
and loan originating expenses over certain loans’ lives.70
PNC Bancorp addressed whether a bank could currently deduct
the following: (1) payments that the bank made to third parties for
activities that helped it determine whether to approve a loan (i.e.,
credit screening, property reports, and appraisals); (2) the security
interest recording costs associated with secured loans; and (3) the internal costs associated with loan marketing, loan origination, and
completing and reviewing loan applications.71
In the late 1980s, the Financial Accounting Standards Board
(FASB)72 promulgated Statement of Financial Standards 91 (SFAS
91), which required banks to separate these types of costs and recognize them over a loan’s life for financial accounting and reporting
purposes.73 Although First National Pennsylvania Corporation
(FNPC) and United Federal Bancorp, Inc., (UFB)74 complied with
SFAS 91, both banks continued to currently deduct those costs for
tax purposes.75 Contrary to its earlier practices, the IRS disallowed
these deductions.76 Apparently, the IRS viewed INDOPCO’s “deductions are exceptions to the norm of capitalization” language as a
“green light” to piggyback onto SFAS 91 and deny deductions for expenses that taxpayers had previously been able to currently deduct.
B. The IRS’s Position in Wells Fargo
The IRS also exploited INDOPCO’s future benefit test to deny
current deductions for all costs associated with merger activity, in69. 212 F.3d 822 (3d Cir. 2000).
70. Id. at 824. “Emboldened by a U.S. Supreme Court case, and a change in private
sector financial accounting standards, the IRS aggressively attempted to squash the deductibility of bank loan costs, casting them out from under the ‘ordinary and necessary’
business expense Code designation, into a quagmire of capitalization.” Mary Ann Fenicato,
PNC Prevails Over IRS: Loan Expense Deductibility Upheld, 2 No. 19 LAW. J. 3, 13 (2000).
71. PNC Bancorp, 212 F.3d at 826.
72. Id. The FASB is “an independent private sector organization that establishes
standards for financial accounting and reporting.” Id. at 825 n.1.
73. Id. at 825.
74. Id. PNC was a bank holding company and the petitioner in the case. FNPC and
UFB merged into PNC in 1992 and 1994, respectively, and PNC succeeded to both companies’ liabilities. Id.
75. Id. at 826.
76. Id. at 827.
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cluding all “in house” costs. For example, in Wells Fargo & Co. v.
Commissioner,77 the IRS tried to deny a deduction for the portion of
the target’s officers’ salaries attributable to their work on a friendly
acquisition, even though the target did not hire any of them specifically for that task.78
Wells Fargo concerned a bank merger between Davenport, an
Iowa state bank, and Norwest, a bank holding company and owner of
Bettendorf Bank.79 Davenport’s management became concerned that
banks of its size would be unable to compete when Iowa adopted interstate banking legislation that allowed banking institutions located
in states next to Iowa to acquire Iowa banks.80 In July 1991, Davenport’s board met to consider a transaction in which Davenport and
Bettendorf would merge to form New Davenport, a national bank
that Norwest would wholly own.81 The parties consummated the deal
in January 1992.82
Prior to July 1991, Davenport spent $83,450 in investigating
Norwest’s and Bettendorf’s products, services, and reputation to ascertain whether Norwest and Bettendorf would be a good business fit
for Davenport and whether the proposed transaction would benefit
the Davenport community.83 Davenport spent another $27,820 in fees
related to the investment bankers’ services, which included “negotiating price, working on the fairness opinion, advising [Davenport]’s
board with respect to fiduciary duties, [and] satisfying securities law
requirements.”84
During 1991, some of Davenport’s officers worked on various aspects of the transaction.85 Davenport, however, did not hire any of
them specifically for that task.86 Instead, it hired them to conduct
Davenport’s day-to-day banking business.87 Moreover, Davenport’s
participation in the transaction had no effect on the officers’ salaries.88 “Of the salaries paid to the officers in 1991, $150,000 was attributable to services performed in the transaction.”89 But when Davenport deducted the salaries, including the $150,000 deduction attributable to the transaction, the Commissioner disallowed the de-

77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

224 F.3d 874 (8th Cir. 2000).
Id. at 880.
Id. at 876-77.
Id. at 877.
Id. at 874.
Id. at 879.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 879-80.
Id. at 880.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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duction.90 The IRS took the position that because the salaries were
attributable to a merger transaction that yielded future benefits, the
taxpayer needed to capitalize them.91 Previously, taxpayers could
currently deduct salaries as ordinary and necessary business expenses. But as it did in PNC Bancorp, the IRS in Wells Fargo aggressively tried to stop those current deductions.
C. The IRS’s Position in Hostile Takeovers
Finally, the IRS exploited the fact that the INDOPCO court failed
to limit its holding to friendly acquisitions by denying deductions for
hostile acquisition defense costs, despite the fact that these costs
yield no future benefit.92 For example, in one case, a target expended
$65 million in legal and investment banking fees and $6.5 million in
executive compensation to resist a hostile takeover.93 However, when
one bidder successfully acquired the target and tried to deduct its
hostile acquisition defense costs, the IRS disallowed its deduction.94
V. THE IRS’S AGGRESSIVE POST-INDOPCO POSITIONS PROMOTE BAD
POLICY
The IRS’s aggressive post-INDOPCO positions discussed in Part
IV are bad from a policy perspective for at least three reasons. First,
the Service’s opportunistic and aggressive positions lack substantive
rationale. Second, they violate the matching principle. Finally, they
ignore the difference between hostile and friendly acquisitions.
A. The IRS’s Positions Lack Rationale
The IRS’s aggressive position in PNC Bancorp was bad from a policy perspective because it lacked substantive rationale. In that case,
the IRS opportunistically tried to piggyback onto SFAS 91 to require
banks to capitalize costs that it had previously allowed banks to currently deduct.95 The court in PNC Bancorp determined that “the reasons for SFAS 91’s requirement that loan origination costs be deferred are reasons wholly specific to the realm of financial accounting, and thus those financial accounting standards do not affect our
tax analysis.”96

90. Id.
91. Id.
92. The Commissioner took this position in A.E. Staley Mfg. Co. v. Comm’r, 119 F.3d
482 (7th Cir. 1997). See infra Part VI.C.
93. Sheppard, supra note 3, at 1458 (discussing Gulf Oil’s attempts to resist the Mesa
Petroleum and Chevron takeovers).
94. Id.
95. See supra Part IV.A.
96. PNC Bancorp, Inc. v. Comm’r, 212 F.3d 822, 832 (3d Cir. 2000).
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The court continued, “[i]n fact, . . . the IRS’s wholesale importation of the line drawn by the financial accounting standards creates
tax consequences that the Commissioner appears not to have considered.”97 Apparently, if banks had to capitalize the loan origination
costs, they would have to include these costs in each loan’s basis.
Such inclusions represented a departure from current practice, as the
bank’s basis in a loan had always been equal to the money the bank
advanced, irrespective of origination costs.98 Therefore, the court saw
the IRS’s failure to consider these and other tax ramifications as an
indication that the IRS lacked independent tax analysis and had
simply bootstrapped financial accounting standards into the tax
arena.99
B. The IRS’s Positions Violate the Matching Principle
The IRS’s aggressive post-INDOPCO positions also led to significant matching principle violations. The primary purpose of distinguishing between expenses that a taxpayer must treat as current deductions versus those that he or she must treat as capital expenditures is to “match expenses with the revenues of the taxable period to
which they are properly attributable.”100 This achieves a more accurate net income calculation for tax purposes.101 For example, when a
taxpayer purchases an asset with a useful life greater than one year,
such as a building, he or she cannot deduct the entire cost of the
building in the purchase year because he or she would underestimate
income in the purchase year and overestimate income in subsequent
years. The matching principle requires a taxpayer to spread the purchase cost over the life of the asset. Problems with this requirement,
as previously discussed in Part II, arise when a taxpayer cannot ascertain the asset’s useful life and must add the cost to the asset’s basis. The requirement creates trouble when the “taxpayer cannot justify a useful life for the intangible asset, leaving the taxpayer with a
capitalized cost but no amortization deduction to match with the income supposedly resulting from the expenditure.”102
If expenses incurred by a target corporation during a takeover, for
example legal and investment banking fees which typically run
into the millions of dollars, are treated as capital expenditures,
they create an intangible asset. However, the useful life of the asset cannot be determined. Thus, no deductions for depreciation or
97. Id. at 832 n.16.
98. Id. at 833.
99. Id. at 834.
100. INDOPCO, Inc. v. Comm’r, 503 U.S. 79, 83-84 (1992).
101. Id.
102. W. Eugene Seago & D. Larry Crumbley, INDOPCO: A Tiger, a Pussycat, or a
Creature Somewhere in Between?, 94 J. TAX’N 14, 15 (2001).
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amortization would be allowed. Consequently, the expenditures, if
capital in nature, have very little tax value. The only deduction
given would be at the dissolution of the enterprise. However, that
possible future deduction is virtually worthless when compared to
the much larger tax benefit received if the expenses are treated as
current deductions.103

For example, the IRS’s aggressive position in Wells Fargo violated
the income matching principle because it forced the corporation to
immediately pay its officers the portion of the salaries attributable to
the merger ($150,000), but refused to allow a corresponding deduction for that expense until the enterprise’s dissolution.104 By that
time, the time value of money would render the deduction worthless.
Therefore, the IRS’s position currently overstates the taxpayer’s income because the taxpayer cannot deduct the salary cost even though
it must pay it currently. Furthermore, no portion of the salaries can
be deducted over future years, unlike a tangible asset where the taxpayer can spread the cost of the asset over its useful life. Rather, the
taxpayer may only take the deduction at the enterprise’s dissolution,
which may occur at some unknown point in time, if at all.
The inability to deduct current expenses until the enterprise’s dissolution creates a unique problem because it leads to a significant
matching principle violation. This matching principle violation creates a greater problem than permitted matching principle violations
like accelerated depreciation deductions because of the uncertainty
regarding the time of dissolution. For example, accelerated depreciation deductions violate the matching principle because they allow
taxpayers to take bigger depreciation deductions at the beginning of
the corresponding asset’s useful life rather than forcing taxpayers to
spread these deductions evenly over the asset’s useful life. Therefore,
the taxpayer’s income will be understated in the asset’s earlier years
and overstated in its later years.105 However, this situation differs
from the situation where a taxpayer pays salaries currently but cannot deduct them until the enterprise’s dissolution, because the taxpayer’s income will be overstated in the year it pays the salary, without knowing whether it will be understated in a future year to correct the initial overstatement. Also, if the enterprise eventually dissolves, that dissolution is so remote that the time value of money
renders that deduction worthless. Although the government loses
some revenue due to the time value of money in the case of an accelerated depreciation deduction, it does not lose all of its revenue. In
the scenario created by INDOPCO, however, if the taxpayer does not

103. Ingalls, supra note 22, at 1170-71.
104. See Wells Fargo & Co. v. Comm’r, 224 F.3d 874 (8th Cir. 2000).
105. Accelerated depreciation benefits taxpayers due to the time value of money.
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dissolve its enterprise, it loses its entire deduction. Furthermore, a
taxpayer must dissolve its enterprise to determine how much of its
deduction was lost due to the time value of money. The government,
on the other hand, loses a quantifiable amount of money. Therefore,
being unable to deduct current expenses until the enterprise’s dissolution is a unique problem because it leads to a significant matching
principle violation.106
C. The IRS’s Positions Ignore the Distinction Between Hostile and
Friendly Acquisitions
The IRS’s aggressive positions also ignore the distinction between
hostile and friendly acquisitions. Unlike expenses connected to
friendly acquisitions, hostile acquisition defense costs do not create a
future benefit.107 They merely maintain a corporation’s status quo.108
Because hostile acquisition defense costs do not enrich a taxpayer
and because the income tax is geared toward taxing wealth, a taxpayer should not have to pay income taxes on hostile acquisition defense costs.109 Finally, courts can detect which costs are associated
with hostile versus friendly acquisitions. Thus, drawing this distinction creates no danger. Taking all of these factors into consideration,
the IRS’s refusal to distinguish between hostile and friendly acquisitions lacks substantive rationale.
First, expenses related to defending a business from a hostile
takeover fit squarely into § 162(a)’s definition of a current deduction.110 To qualify under § 162(a), an item must be: (1) paid or incurred during the taxable year; (2) used for carrying on any trade or
business; (3) an expense; (4) a necessary expense; and (5) an ordinary
expense.111 An expense to defend against a hostile acquisition clearly
represents an expense the taxpayer pays during the taxable year for
the purpose of carrying on a trade or business.112 Moreover:
[i]n light of [the duties the board of directors owes shareholders], it
easily can be argued that expenditures made in defense of a hostile
106. One commentator argues that the matching principle is not a tax value but rather
a financial accounting concept. Deborah A. Geier, The Myth of the Matching Principle as a
Tax Value, 15 AM. J. TAX POL’Y 17 (1998). Geier’s article, however, espouses the minority
view. The matching principle is very much regarded as a “systematic tax benefit rule.” See
Julie A. Roin, Unmasking the “Matching Principle” in Tax Law, 79 VA. L. REV. 813, 814
(1993).
107. Heidi Katheryn Wambach, The Deductability of Business Expenses Incurred in a
Hostile Takeover: Staley Rides Again, 51 SMU L. REV. 1603, 1626 (1998).
108. Id.
109. Although one could argue that a future benefit exists in being a company that nobody can takeover, the IRS has never tried to make this argument. Moreover, this benefit
seems more psychic than economic.
110. Wambach, supra note 107, at 1620.
111. Comm’r v. Lincoln Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 403 U.S. 345, 352 (1971).
112. Wambach, supra note 107, at 1626-27.
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acquirer’s bid should not be capitalized but rather deducted in the
current year because such duties make the board’s defenses “necessary.” In addition, such defenses are “ordinary” in that any and
every board would act in conformance with these fiduciary mandates.113

Furthermore, unlike friendly takeover expenses, § 263(a) does not
apply to hostile acquisition defense costs because these costs do not
provide a future benefit.114 Rather, they leave the company in the
same position it found itself in before the attempted takeover.115 Because hostile acquisition expenses are inherently different from
friendly acquisition expenses, the IRS should let taxpayers treat hostile acquisition expenses differently by allowing them to currently
deduct hostile acquisition expenses while requiring them to capitalize friendly acquisition expenses.
Some commentators argue that allowing taxpayers to currently
deduct defensive activities costs “amounts to a governmental subsidy
to parties resisting tender offers.”116 One commentator insists that
because “allowing a deduction indicates Congress’s willingness to
permit or often encourage the activity that qualifies for the deduction,”117 allowing a current deduction for hostile acquisition expenses
encourages “corporate taxpayers to push the limits of credulity and
attempt to attribute as many expenses as possible to defensive
measures devoid of any future benefit.”118
Tax laws truly can have unintended effects on taxpayers. For example, assigning fair market value basis to property in decedents’ estates119 creates an incentive for people to retain property rather than
sell it and put it to its best use. This unintended effect, however, becomes neutralized by a tax objective, namely that estates pay taxes
on a property’s fair market value and not on the value of the decedent’s basis in the property.120 Similarly, although allowing a deduction for hostile acquisition defense costs may inadvertently encourage companies to engage in more hostile acquisition defense activities, another tax objective cancels this effect: the taxation of income

113. Id. at 1622.
114. Sarah R. Lyke, Note, INDOPCO, Inc. v. Commissioner: National Starch Decision
Adds Wrinkles to Capital Expenditure Issue, 88 NW. U. L. REV. 1239, 1258-59 (1994) (“Like
a repair, the defense is not an improvement and thus yields no continuing benefit.”).
115. Id. at 1258 (“[S]uch costs, like repair costs, are incurred only to maintain the
status quo.”).
116. Roberts, supra note 33, at 513.
117. Id.
118. Id.; see also Sheppard, supra note 3, at 1460 (“[A]re not the parties just haggling
about price? Expenses of resisting a hostile takeover could be viewed as part of a larger
capital transaction.”).
119. I.R.C. § 1014(a)(1) (1994 & Supp. V 1999).
120. Id. § 2031(a) (1994).
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as a proxy to taxing wealth.121 Therefore, not taxing companies that
have spent a lot of money defending themselves because they have
little wealth and, consequently, cannot pay more taxes, overrides the
possible unintended effect of encouraging companies to engage in
more hostile acquisition defense activities.
To address this commentator’s second point, judges are wise
enough to know when taxpayers are trying to pull the wool over their
eyes by disguising friendly acquisition costs as hostile acquisition
costs. For example, in Victory Markets, Inc. v. Commissioner,122 the
petitioner argued that its acquirer was unfriendly. However, the
court determined the opposite.123 Victory Markets was a publicly
traded corporation in the over-the-counter market, where its common
stock traded from $15.50 to $24.50 per share between May 1985 and
May 27, 1986.124 When LNC Industries Proprietary, Ltd. (LNC), began targeting Victory Markets on May 23, 1986, Victory Markets rejected LNC’s initial $30 per share offer.125 However, on June 8, 1986,
it agreed to merge with LNC for $37 per share.126
The court addressed whether Victory Markets could currently deduct the expenditures incident to LNC’s acquisition.127 Victory Markets argued that, unlike the acquirer in INDOPCO, LNC acquired
Victory Markets in a hostile takeover and therefore INDOPCO did
not apply.128 However, the court found that “[w]hile petitioner had
painstakingly attempted to characterize the nature of the takeover
as hostile, the evidence does not support such a characterization or
finding.”129 The court found the following facts indicated that the
transaction was friendly: (1) Victory Markets entered into an agreement and plan of merger with LNC only sixteen days after LNC’s initial contact with it;130 (2) LNC’s initial contact letter stated its desire
to negotiate a mutually acceptable merger agreement and its hope
that the “transaction can be completed on a mutually acceptable and
friendly basis”131; (3) “at no time did LNC attempt to circumvent the
board of directors by making a tender offer directly to petitioner’s

121. See Alvin Warren, Would a Consumption Tax Be Fairer Than an Income Tax? 89
YALE L.J. 1081, 1081 (1980) (“Levying the tax on income is . . . simply a logical concomitant
of the proposition that society in general has a claim on its annual product that is prior to
the claim of its individual citizens.”).
122. 99 T.C. 648 (1992).
123. Id. at 661-62.
124. Id. at 649.
125. Id. at 651, 654.
126. Id. at 655.
127. Id. at 657.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 661-62.
130. Id. at 655.
131. Id. at 662.
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shareholders”132; and (4) the board did not activate its dividend rights
plan, one of its hostile takeover defenses.133 Therefore, Victory Markets not only illustrates that courts can distinguish between friendly
and hostile transactions, but it also outlines many factors that future
courts can use as guidance to distinguish between different types of
corporate transactions.
Commentators are also concerned by the fact that after the target
unsuccessfully defends the acquisition, the acquirer becomes the
party seeking the deductions for the target’s unsuccessful resistance
costs.134 This fact concerns commentators because the acquirertaxpayer simultaneously capitalizes its own acquisition costs and
currently deducts the former target’s defense costs.135
Although this dichotomy seems like a bonus to the acquirer, it
really is not. When an acquirer buys a corporation, it buys all of its
assets and liabilities. Therefore, although the acquirer buys a company with currently deductible defense costs, it also buys a company
with less assets because a portion of them paid for heavy investment
banking fees.
VI. NOTHING LEFT OF INDOPCO
Displeased with the IRS’s aggressive positions, post-INDOPCO
courts have limited INDOPCO considerably. The Third Circuit prevented the IRS from forcing taxpayers to capitalize previously deductible expenses without a valid tax rationale, despite INDOPCO’s
“deductions are exceptions to the norm of capitalization” language,
by placing an extra restriction on the separate and distinct asset
test.136 The Eighth Circuit prevented the IRS from forcing taxpayers
to capitalize previously deductible expenses by severely restricting
INDOPCO’s future benefit test.137 Finally, using the business attack
defense doctrine, the Seventh Circuit narrowed INDOPCO’s holding
to apply only to friendly takeover acquisitions.138
A. PNC Bancorp Places a Restriction on the Separate and Distinct
Asset Test
Courts have limited INDOPCO by narrowly applying the separate
and distinct asset test. For example, in PNC Bancorp, the court restricted the separate and distinct asset test by holding that to be
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.

Id.
Id.
Roberts, supra note 33, at 513 n.161.
Id.
PNC Bancorp, Inc. v. Comm’r, 212 F.3d 822, 830 (3d Cir. 2000).
Wells Fargo & Co. v. Comm’r, 224 F.3d 874, 886 (8th Cir. 2000).
A.E. Staley Mfg. Co. v. Comm’r, 119 F.3d 482, 489 (7th Cir. 1997).
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capitalizable, an expense must create a separate and distinct asset or
be more than an expense associated with separate and distinct asset
creation.139 This clever distinction prevented the IRS from forcing
banks to capitalize expenses it had always deducted.140
PNC Bancorp addressed whether a bank could deduct certain
marketing, researching, and loan originating expenses.141 The Third
Circuit held these costs currently deductible and initially found that
they were clearly ordinary and necessary business expenses under §
162(a).142 The court then addressed whether the banks incurred these
costs for “betterments to increase the value of property in a way that
would require these costs’ capitalization under § 263.”143 The court
applied Lincoln Savings’s separate and distinct asset test and concluded that the taxpayer’s marketing and origination activities were
currently deductible because they did not actually “create” the banks’
loans in the same way that the activities in Lincoln Savings created
the Secondary Reserve fund.144 Although the expenses in question
were either associated with the loans, incurred in connection with
the acquisition of the loans, or “directly related to the creation of the
loans,” they did not “create” the loans.145 The court contrasted the
way the payments themselves formed the Secondary Reserve corpus
in Lincoln Savings with how the expenses in this case did not become
part of the loan balance.146
The Third Circuit in PNC Bancorp restricts the IRS’s aggressive
position in two ways. First, it places an extra restriction on the separate and distinct asset test, which distinguishes between costs that
create a separate and distinct asset versus costs associated only with
a separate and distinct asset’s creation. Apparently, the court recognized that the IRS’s opportunistic pursuit of capitalization for previously deductible expenses lacked substantive rationale.147
139. PNC Bancorp, 212 F.3d at 830.
140. See id. at 834-35.
141. Id. at 824. The PNC Bancorp tax court held that taxpayers cannot currently deduct these costs because banks incur them to create new loans, which are separate and distinct bank assets. Therefore, banks must capitalize these costs as though they created a
separate and distinct asset. PNC Bancorp, Inc. v. Comm’r, 110 T.C. 349, 375 (1998), rev’d,
212 F.3d 822 (3d Cir. 2000).
142. PNC Bancorp, 212 F.3d at 829.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 829-30.
145. Id. (quoting PNC Bancorp, Inc. v. Comm’r, 110 T.C. 349, 366 (1998)).
146. Id. at 830.
147. Id. at 824-25.
Historically, the costs at issue have been deductible in the year that they are
incurred; however, the Commissioner rejected this tax treatment by PNC. Why
is the Commissioner now insisting upon capitalization of these costs? . . . [T]he
IRS apparently viewed INDOPCO as a reason to pursue capitalization of the
costs that SFAS 91 requires to be deferred.
Id.
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Second, the PNC Bancorp court reduced INDOPCO to its facts by
confining it to mergers.148 The court used language such as “in the
merger situation presented in INDOPCO,”149 as well as “[i]n the
INDOPCO context of a friendly takeover, the Court found . . . .”150
These statements indicate that the court narrowly construed
INDOPCO.
B. Wells Fargo Extends the “Origin of the Claim” Doctrine to Create
the Direct/Indirect Test
The Wells Fargo court also prevented the IRS from forcing taxpayers to capitalize previously deductible expenses by severely restricting INDOPCO’s future benefit test. One commentator accurately predicted the IRS’s position in Wells Fargo:
If “the existence of future benefits” is the key criterion for capitalization despite the capital transaction facts of INDOPCO, taxpayers may very well encounter nondeductibility of expenses that
were heretofore believed to be currently deductible, including the
following items: . . . Executive salaries and other expenses associated with strategic planning by middle level and upper level management in developing plans and techniques for business growth
and expansion . . . . The rationale? A business’s growth is a long
term benefit. If the CEO and other senior executives of a corporation spend half their time in strategic planning and developing
growth strategies, then perhaps an allocable one-half of their compensation must be capitalized.151

Indeed, in Wells Fargo, the IRS tried to deny a deduction of
$150,000, which represented the portion of the target’s officers’ salaries attributable to their work on the acquisition, even though the
target did not hire any of them specifically for that task.152 Although
the Tax Court sided with the IRS,153 the Eighth Circuit held that the
taxpayer need not capitalize the $150,000.154 The appellate court rea-

148. See Fenicato, supra, note 70, at 14 (“Since PNC’s costs could not even remotely
resemble a merger, the Court confined INDOPCO to its facts, reined-in the IRS, and pulled
the plug on its broad interpretation of INDOPCO.”).
149. PNC Bancorp, 212 F.3d at 833.
150. Id.
151. Elliot, supra note 2, at 31.
152. Wells Fargo & Co. v. Comm’r, 224 F.3d 874, 880 (8th Cir. 2000).
153. Norwest Corp. v. Comm’r, 112 T.C. 89, 102 (1999), rev’d sub nom. Wells Fargo &
Co. v. Comm’r, 224 F.3d 874 (8th Cir. 2000).
In sum, we hold that [the taxpayer] may not deduct any of the disputed costs
because all costs were sufficiently related to an event that produced a significant long-term benefit. Although the costs were not incurred as direct costs of
facilitating the event that produced the long-term benefit, the costs were essential to the achievement of that benefit.
Id.
154. Wells Fargo, 224 F.3d at 889.
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soned that because the salary expenses related only indirectly to the
merger, they were currently deductible.155 Importantly, this holding
recognized that to capitalize an expense, the expense not only must
relate to a transaction that produces a future benefit, but also must
directly relate to that transaction.
The Wells Fargo court arrived at this direct/indirect test by extending the “origin of the claim doctrine,” which it had originally
used to distinguish personal expenses from business expenses and
capital business expenses from ordinary business expenses.156 In doing so, the Wells Fargo court restricted INDOPCO’s future benefit
test. Applying this new version of the future benefit test, Wells Fargo
distinguished itself from INDOPCO by finding that the costs in
INDOPCO directly related to the acquisition, while Wells Fargo’s petitioner’s costs related indirectly to the acquisition because they
originated from an employment relationship.157 Accordingly, the taxpayer in INDOPCO had to capitalize its expenses, while the taxpayer
in Wells Fargo did not. By placing an additional restriction on the future benefit test, the Eighth Circuit further limited INDOPCO.
C. A.E. Staley Narrows INDOPCO to Friendly Acquisitions
Finally, in A.E. Staley Manufacturing Co. v. Commissioner,158 the
Seventh Circuit severely restricted INDOPCO’s application by limiting it to friendly acquisitions. A.E. Staley addressed whether a target
could currently deduct the investment banking fees it incurred while
defending against a hostile takeover.159 In holding that it could, the
court reasoned that costs associated with hostile takeover defense
costs differed from friendly acquisition costs because hostile takeover
defense costs were considered business attack defense costs.160 The
“business attack defense” states that businesses can deduct expenses
that they incur “for the protection of an existing investment, the continuation of an existing business, or the preservation of existing income from loss or diminution . . . .”161 A.E. Staley marked the first appellate court case to apply the business attack defense to a hostile
takeover scenario.162 In A.E. Staley, the court found that taxpayers
155. Id. at 888.
156. Id. at 886.
157. Id. at 887-88.
158. 119 F.3d 482 (7th Cir. 1997).
159. Id.
160. Id. at 491-92.
161. Id. at 488 n.2 (quoting NCNB Corp. v. United States, 684 F.2d 285, 290 (4th Cir.
1982)).
162. The first court to apply the business attack defense to a hostile takeover scenario
was a bankruptcy court. In re Federated Dep’t Stores, 171 B.R. 603 (S.D. Ohio 1994). That
court found that INDOPCO did not undermine the earlier business attack defense decisions. Id. at 608-10. Furthermore, it found that hostile takeover cases are business attack
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could assert the business attack defense in hostile acquisitions because INDOPCO neither abrogated nor addressed cases such as
NCNB Corp. v. United States.163
A.E. Staley involved a merger between a target, Staley Continental, Inc. and Subsidiaries (SCI), and an acquirer, Tate & Lyle.164
When SCI began to fear the possibility of a hostile takeover, it hired
a law firm to advise it on anti-takeover measures.165 SCI also hired
Merrill Lynch as its investment banker to prepare, advise, and assist
SCI in the event of a hostile takeover.166 Because Merrill Lynch suggested “that SCI identify friendly ‘white knight’ investors to acquire
enough stock in SCI to block any future takeover attempt, SCI
sought out Tate & Lyle and discussed the possibility of Tate & Lyle’s
acquiring a 20 percent interest in SCI.”167 But when Tate & Lyle acquired four percent of the company, SCI began to fear that Tate &
Lyle would try to acquire the entire company.168
Tate & Lyle confirmed SCI’s anxiety and turned from a white
knight into a dark prince, making a $32 per share tender offer directly to SCI’s stockholders.169 Moreover, it sued SCI to enjoin its use
of anti-takeover devices.170 But because SCI’s board recognized it had
a duty to evaluate the tender offer’s merits, it hired the investment

defense cases because they involve taxpayers who incur expenses to protect corporate policy and structure but not to acquire a new asset. Id.
163. 684 F.2d 285 (4th Cir. 1982). An issue in NCNB concerned whether North Carolina National Bank’s parent corporation, NCNB Corporation, could currently deduct the
expenses incurred in developing and operating a statewide network of branch banking facilities. Id. at 290. In holding that it could, the court reasoned that such expenses were
necessary to maintain NCNB’s position in the banking industry. Id. In other words, these
expenses were currently deductible as business defense expenses. The court also discussed
a case, Comm’r v. Heininger, 320 U.S. 467 (1943), in which the U.S. Supreme Court held
that a taxpayer could currently deduct the legal fees he incurred in litigating against an
order by the Postmaster General depriving his mail order business from use of the mails.
Id. at 474. The Court reasoned that because the Postmaster General’s legal action threatened to destroy the taxpayer’s business, the taxpayer could deduct the costs as ordinary
and necessary business expenses. Id. at 471. The A.E. Staley court also discussed a case,
Locke Mfg. Cos. v. United States, 237 F. Supp. 80 (D. Conn. 1964), where the court held
that a company could deduct its proxy contest expenses after successfully resisting a
stockholder’s challenge, “including legal fees, proxy solicitor’s fees and public relations
fees.” A.E. Staley, 119 F.3d at 488. The A.E. Staley court quoted a portion of Locke that discussed how “it was ordinary for a company to spend money ‘to defend the policies of its directors from attack by those who would oppose them.’” Id. at 488 (quoting Locke, 237 F.
Supp. at 86-87).
164. A.E. Staley, 119 F.3d at 484.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id. Evidence that Tate & Lyle would try to acquire the entire company included
the fact that it would not sign a “standstill agreement” which would have limited the
amount of SCI stock it could purchase. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id.
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bankers for advice and assistance.171 SCI’s board then unanimously
voted to reject the $32 per share offer and a subsequent $35 per
share offer.172 But when Tate & Lyle increased its tender offer to
$36.50 per share, the board voted to accept the offer because the investment bankers said it was fair and because no alternative acquirers surfaced.173
By the time the parties consummated the transaction, SCI had
paid the investment bankers $12.5 million for services in connection
with SCI’s tender offers.174 SCI attempted to deduct these costs as
business expenses, but the Commissioner disallowed the deduction.175
Because the Supreme Court failed to limit its INDOPCO holding to
friendly acquisitions, the IRS attempted to make the taxpayer capitalize its hostile acquisition defense costs.176 Moreover, the IRS tried
to enforce a “per se transformation rule,” which states that any
transaction where a corporate taxpayer is transformed from a publicly held corporation to a single shareholder corporation involves a
future benefit and, therefore, any expenses the taxpayer incurs with
respect to such a transformation are capital expenditures.177
The tax court sided with the IRS, although it tried to avoid adopting the per se transformation rule.178 The court found that the taxpayer had to capitalize the hostile acquisition defense costs for the
following reasons: the new owner saw synergy opportunities; the
board eventually approved the transaction; and the same shareholder-related benefits that the Supreme Court looked at in
INDOPCO, including the reduction in shareholder-related benefits,
existed in this case.179
However, as Judge Cohen’s dissent stated, the only future benefits
discussed in the majority opinion were those the acquirer perceived.180 Moreover, the majority’s statement about reduction of
shareholder-related expenses made it seem as if it is always better
for a corporation to be privately held rather than publicly held.181
But, as Judge Laro noted in his dissent, “[a] private company does
not have access to the public markets for new capital and does not

171. Id.
172. Id. at 485.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. A.E. Staley Mfg. Co. v. Comm’r, 105 T.C. 166, 191-92 (1995), rev’d, 119 F.3d 482
(7th Cir. 1997).
178. Id. at 200.
179. Id. at 198.
180. Id. at 215 (Cohen, J., dissenting).
181. Id.
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have the same liquidity for its shareholders.”182 Thus, Judge Laro
suggested that one cannot conclude that a company achieves a benefit in itself just by going private.183
Convinced by the Tax Court’s dissents, the Seventh Circuit reversed the Tax Court.184 It found that SCI’s hostile acquisition costs
were costs associated with defending a business rather than costs associated with facilitating a capital transaction.185 It reasoned that
“SCI was defending against an unwanted acquisition in an effort to
maintain and protect an established business.”186 Therefore, SCI’s
hostile acquisition defense costs were currently deductible.187
Remarkably, this holding declined to follow INDOPCO, even
though the INDOPCO opinion did not indicate that the “friendly” aspect of the transaction was dispositive or that the outcome would differ if the takeover were considered “hostile.”188 Evidently, the court
disagreed with the IRS’s aggressive post-INDOPCO positions and restricted the IRS by carving a big chunk out of INDOPCO. After the
A.E. Staley decision, trial courts in the Seventh Circuit may only apply INDOPCO to friendly acquisitions.
Additionally, A.E. Staley provided target corporations with the §
165 safety net. Section 165 provides that “[t]here shall be allowed as
a deduction any loss sustained during the taxable year and not compensated for by insurance or otherwise.”189 Particularly, § 165 permits taxpayers to deduct costs associated with abandoned capital
transactions.190 Therefore, the court found that SCI could have deducted the investment banking fees and other costs it incurred while
resisting Tate & Lyle’s takeover under this section also.191 The court
seemed to tell taxpayers that if other circuits fail to respect the hostile versus friendly acquisition distinction, § 165 gives them another
shield to protect themselves from the IRS’s aggressive positions.192

182. Id. at 219 (Laro, J., dissenting).
183. Id.
184. A.E. Staley Mfg. Co. v. Comm’r, 119 F.3d 482, 493 (7th Cir. 1997).
185. Id. at 489-90.
186. Id. at 490.
187. Id. at 491.
188. Roberts, supra note 33, at 494 n.38.
189. I.R.C. § 165(a) (1994).
190. A.E. Staley, 119 F.3d at 490.
191. Id.
192. However, § 165 is less effective than the business attack defense because it does
not cover successful defensive techniques such as a self-tender. Roberts, supra note 33, at
519.

300

FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 29:277

VII. NOTHING LEFT OF INDOPCO: LET’S KEEP IT THAT WAY!
Although post-INDOPCO courts have severely restricted
INDOPCO, it is still “the supreme law of the land.”193 Furthermore,
nine of twelve circuits still have not commented on the case. The circuits that have spoken on INDOPCO have each overturned tax court
decisions that sided with the IRS.194 Therefore, Congress should direct the Treasury to enact regulations that codify the Third, Seventh
and Eighth Circuit holdings to unify the law in all circuits. If the
Treasury does not enact such regulations, the IRS will continue to
pursue its aggressive positions and use the ammunition provided by
INDOPCO against taxpayers.195 First, INDOPCO contains the following powerful and pro-IRS language: “deductions are exceptions to the
norm of capitalization.” Second, INDOPCO favors the IRS by lifting
the “separate and distinct asset barrier” that five circuits have used
to confine the IRS. After INDOPCO, the IRS could deny current deductions in cases where the expense created some type of future
benefit for the taxpayer, even though it did not create a separate and
distinct asset. Finally, because the Supreme Court in INDOPCO did
not limit its holding to friendly acquisitions, the IRS could freely
deny current deductions for expenses related to both friendly and
hostile acquisitions. Despite A.E. Staley’s holding, which limited
INDOPCO to friendly acquisitions, “[t]he IRS has vowed to pursue
capitalization in Staley-type issues in the future.”196
Another justification for codification of the Third, Seventh and
Eighth Circuit holdings relates to the poor policy that the IRS’s aggressive post-INDOPCO positions promote. First, the Service’s aggressive, opportunistic positions lack substantive rationale. Second,
the Service’s aggressive positions violate the matching principle. Finally, the Service’s aggressive positions ignore the difference between
hostile and friendly acquisitions. Therefore, the Treasury should
promote a sound policy by enacting such regulations.
The Treasury should enact the suggested regulations by including
them as “Types of Non-Capital Expenditures” under § 263(a)’s treasury regulations. The first type of noncapital expenditures the Treasury should include are expenses regularly incurred in the creation of

193. INDOPCO was also a unanimous decision.
194. E.g., Wells Fargo & Co. v. Comm’r, 224 F.3d 874 (8th Cir. 2000), rev’g Norwest
Corp. v. Comm’r, 112 T.C. 89 (1999); PNC Bancorp, Inc. v. Comm’r, 212 F.3d 822 (3d Cir.
2000), rev’g 110 T.C. 349 (1998); A.E. Staley Mfg. Co. v. Comm’r, 119 F.3d 482 (7th Cir.
1997), rev’g 105 T.C. 166 (1995).
195. Seago & Crumbley, supra note 102, at 14 (“The Supreme Court’s decision in
INDOPCO . . . created a new weapon for IRS agents and much uncertainty for tax practitioners.”) (citation omitted).
196. Wambach, supra note 107, at 1621.
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separate and distinct assets.197 Examples of these types of noncapital
expenditures include the marketing, researching, and loan originating expenses at issue in PNC Bancorp.198 The Treasury should also
include expenses incurred in connection with, but not directly related
to, a capital acquisition. An example of this type of noncapital expenditure is the portion of the target officers’ salaries attributable to
their work on a friendly acquisition, such as the one involved in Wells
Fargo.199 Finally, the Treasury should include expenses incurred to
defend a business against a hostile acquisition. An example of this
type of noncapital expenditure is the investment banking fees the
target paid Merrill Lynch in A.E. Staley.200
Alternatively, the treasury regulations could enumerate the type
of capital acquisition costs that are capitalizable and limit those costs
to investment banking and legal fees associated with friendly acquisitions. The Treasury should also list factors to help courts distinguish between friendly and hostile acquisitions. For this purpose, the
Treasury should borrow Victory Markets’ factors.201 Such factors include: (1) the number of days elapsed from initial contact to the parties’ final agreement; (2) whether the acquirer went directly to the
shareholders, thereby circumventing the board of directors; and (3)
whether the target had anti-takeover devices, such as poison pills,
but failed to use them.202
VIII. CONCLUSION
Although INDOPCO’s reach initially frightened taxpayers, in the
last decade courts have stepped in to ease some of these fears. Recognizing that the IRS’s aggressive post-INDOPCO behavior promotes
bad policy, courts have used a range of judicial doctrines to contain
this behavior. However, because INDOPCO represents current law
and many circuits have yet to touch upon the numerous issues it
raises, taxpayers need more protection from INDOPCO. Therefore,
Congress should direct the Treasury to enact regulations that codify
the Third, Seventh and Eighth Circuit holdings to prevent the IRS
from asserting its aggressive post-INDOPCO positions in other circuits.

197. The petitioner took this position in PNC Bancorp. 110 T.C. at 349.
198. See id. at 366.
199. E.g., Norwest Corp. v. Comm’r, 112 T.C. 89, 102 (1999), rev’d sub nom. Wells
Fargo & Co. v. Comm’r, 224 F.3d 874 (8th Cir. 2000).
200. E.g., A.E. Staley Mfg. Co. v. Comm’r, 105 T.C. 166, 219 (1995), rev’d, 119 F.3d 482,
493 (7th Cir. 1997).
201. See Victory Mkts., Inc. v. Comm’r, 99 T.C. 648 (1992).
202. Id. at 655, 662.

